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Abstract
This paper studies the choice of monetary policy regime in a small open economy under
productivity shocks and noise traders in forex markets. We focus on two simple rules: xed
exchange rates and ination targeting. We contrast the above two rules against optimal policy
with commitment. In general, the presence of noise traders increases the desirability of a xed
exchange rate regime. We also evaluate the welfare impact of Tobin taxes on capital ows. These
taxes help unambiguously in the absence of productivity shocks; their welfare impact under
productivity shocks depends on the monetary regime in place and the trade elasticity between
domestic and foreign goods.
Keywords: Noise traders; Fixed exchange rates; Tobin taxes; Optimal monetary policy.
JEL Classification: E42, E52, F41
1 Introduction
There exists a large body of literature on market microstructure models that examine the role of
noise traders in generating excess volatility in the foreign exchange (forex) market. This paper
incorporates noise traders into a New Keynesian model of a small open economy with incomplete
markets. We welfare-rank two simple rules, namely xed exchange rate (PEG) and ination target-
ing (IT), by identifying the rule that in terms of welfare is closest to the optimal monetary policy
under commitment. In addition, we examine the welfare implications of imposing Tobin taxes on
capital ows.
We show that the di¤erences in welfare across these regimes can be mapped with the real
exchange rate volatility that the regimes allow relative to what the optimal policy calls for. Optimal
policy requires stabilizing real exchange rates in the presence of noise traders. As a result, a PEG
outperforms an IT regime under productivity shocks and noise traders. Real exchange rates can
also be stabilized by using Tobin taxes. However, these taxes improve welfare only under IT regime
when domestic and foreign goods are substitutes in household consumption. When the two goods
are compliments, Tobin taxes improve welfare under both regimes.
Our work is related to Jeanne and Rose (2002) who in a exible price setup show that it is
optimal to stabilize the exchange rate as oating exchange rates attract noise traders and increase
overall volatility. Their paper thus rationalizes the benet of having a credible xed exchange rate
regime. Shi and Xu (2009) build on Jeanne and Rose (2002) and show that Tobin taxes a¤ect
exchange rate volatility by a¤ecting the relative population of noise traders in the forex market.
However, these two papers have no output or ination dynamics and rely on ad-hoc welfare metrics.
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Our framework, on the other hand, generates endogenous dynamics including an expectational
IS and Phillips curve. Optimal policy maximizes a quadratic approximation of the households
utility, a feature of recent papers on optimal monetary policy in small open economies (see, for
example, Gali and Monacelli, 2005; De Paoli, 2009a and 2009b). This not only facilitates a simple
insightful presentation of optimal policies, but also permits a straightforward comparison of simple
ad-hoc rules. Our work is closely related with De Paoli (2009b) who shows that in a small open
economy with incomplete markets a domestic IT regime outperforms a PEG when the elasticity
of substitution between domestic and foreign goods is high, and vice versa when the elasticity is
low. In contrast, we show that with noise in the forex market a PEG dominates an IT regime
unambiguously.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops the basic model with noise traders.
Section 3 studies and welfare ranks the alternative monetary policy regimes. Section 4 provides a
summary of the results and concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Households
Our model is a small open economy (henceforth, Home) with incomplete markets that closely
follows De Paoli (2009b). The world economy (henceforth, Foreign) is populated with a continuum
of household of unit mass, where the fraction of the population in the segment [0; n) belongs to Home
and the remainder in the segment [n; 1] belongs to Foreign. The utility function of a representative
Home household is
Ut = Et
1X
s=t
s t
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where Ct is individual consumption,  is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion,  is the inverse
of the elasticity of labor supply, and  is a random productivity shock. The household produces a
continuum of goods [0; n] and yj denotes her output of good j. The consumption aggregate for a
Home consumer is dened as:
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(2)
The parameter  > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between consumption of Home- and Foreign-
produced goods (henceforth, trade elasticity), CH and CF ; respectively;  is the elasticity of sub-
stitution within goods produced at Home as well as within goods imported from Foreign. The
parameter determining Home consumers preferences for Foreign goods, 1  v; is a function of the
relative size of Foreign, 1   n, and of the degree of openness, . Specically, 1    = (1   n).
This specication gives rise to home bias in consumption, as a result of which there are deviations
from purchasing power parity. Foreign preferences are dened symmetrically with  = n; to
di¤erentiate from Home, its variables are denoted with an asterisk.
Let PH and PF denote the price indices for Home- and Foreign-produced consumption aggre-
2
gates, respectively, and let P denote the price index for Homes overall consumption aggregate.4
Then the real exchange rate can be expressed as Q  S P P , where P  is the Foreign counterpart
of P , and S is the nominal exchange rate in terms of Home currency per unit of Foreign currency.
Finally, let Y denote the Home output. Then, the demand side of the small open economy (as
n ! 0) can be written in the log-linear form, with small case letters denoting log deviations from
steady states of their corresponding upper case variables, as5
yt = (1  ) ct + ct + qt; (3)
where  =  (2  ) = (1  ).
Prices are set following the standard Calvo formulation and the supply side of the economy can
be represented in the log-linear form as
t = k

ct + yt +

1  qt   t

+ Ett+1 (4)
where  denotes the domestic (producer) price ination; k  (1  ) (1  ) = (1 + ) ;where 
is the fraction of rms that does not change prices.
2.2 International bond market
To introduce noise traders into the model, we rst assume that Home households cannot directly
participate in Foreign bond market but they can trade domestically in risk free bonds (B) denom-
inated in Home currency. The budget constraint of the Home household is given by
PtCt +
Bt
1 + it
= ft +Bt 1 + (1  Tt)PH;tYt + PH;tTrt; (5)
where it is the nominal interest rate, Tt is the income tax, and Trt are lump-sum transfers from the
government. While households trade in the Home-currency bond market, trade in Foreign-currency
bonds is carried out by specialized forex dealers who trade in the interest of households by utilizing
households investments in the Home-currency bond market. Thus, ft in (5) above denotes net
prot of forex traders that they fully rebate to the households.
Following Jeanne and Rose (2002), forex traders are modelled as overlapping generation of
investors who live for two periods. In the rst period they borrow funds from the households and
purchase Foreign-currency bonds BF . In the second period, they liquidate foreign bonds to repay
loans from Home bond market, and transfer their prots net of taxes to householdsaccounts. To
avoid non-stationarity in the model, following Schmidtt-Grohé and Uribe (2003), we assume that
Foreign interest rate earned by forex traders is subject to an intermediation cost,  , decreasing
(increasing) in tradersreal foreign asset (debt) position, i.e.,  0 < 0. Specically, gross Foreign
interest rate earned by traders is 1 +bit = (1 + it ) BF;tStPt  ; where it is the nominal interest for
4Following (2), P =

P 1 H + (1  )P 1 F
1=(1 )
; PH =

1
n
R n
0
p (z)1  dz
1=(1 )
and PF =h
1
1 n
R 1
n
p (z)1  dz
i1=(1 )
, where p (z) is the price of good z:
5A detailed version of our paper where all derivations have been provided is available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2241262
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Foreign residents.6 Thus, a Home forex trader born in period t 1 borrows and invests St 1BF;t 1
1+bit 1 of
Home currency to receive BF;t 1 units of foreign currency in t. After repaying
St 1BF;t 1
1+bit 1 (1 + it 1)
to its lenders, the traders net Home-currency return per unit of Foreign bonds is:
$t = St   St 1 1 + it 1
1 +bit 1
To evaluate Tobin taxes as a policy instrument, we assume that a trader purchasing BF;t pays
real foreign capital trading tax of t = 2

St BF;t
P
2
levied and collected by the government in units
of Home goods.7 As a result, a trader j born at t maximizes the expected present value of prots:
max
BF;t
Ejt
24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  Pt
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2
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j
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where Ejt refers to the conditional expectation of trader j at time t:
8 The traders optimal choice
of BjF;t follows from
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which shows that the tradersoptimal investment depends upon their exchange rate expectations
and, as one would expect, the demand for foreign bonds is decreasing in the Tobin tax. Following
De Long et al. (1990), we assume that a fraction G 2 [0; 1] of the forex dealers are noise traders.
Their expectations about the future real exchange rate are noisy in the sense that they may deviate
from the rational expectations by a noise shock. This leads to di¤erences in the expectations
between noise traders and informed traders resulting in irrational, non-fundamentals-driven trade.
This non-fundamental trade is useful for discussing potential gains from nancial transaction taxes:
if noise trading introduces an excess volatility in the real economy, a transactions tax which may
be expected to curb noise trading may thereby also reduce noise-trade-driven excess real volatility.
Formally, the informed traders form the model-consistent rational forecast:
EIt [qt+1   qt] = Et [qt+1   qt] ; (8)
whereas the noise traders have
ENt [qt+1   qt] = Et [qt+1   qt] + vt; (9)
where vt is white noise with variance 2v .
6As in De Paoli (2009b), we assume that the spread bit   it is renumerated to the international intermediaries who
rebate it equally among foreign housheolds.
7The assumption on  is standard in the literature and is made to prevent traders from receiving subsidies by
taking a short position. We also assume that the Tobin tax is collected at the end of the period. This does not a¤ect
any of the qualitative implications.
8The trader js ex-post prots that are transferred to the households are however given as
fj;t+1 = $t+1B
j
F;t   PH;t 
2
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j
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2.3 Market Clearing
Market clearing in the domestic bond market requires
Bt
1 + it
=
StBF;t
1 +bit ; (10)
where the LHS is the amount of funds invested by households in Home bonds and the RHS is
the Home-currency value of Foreign bonds purchased by forex traders. The government runs a
balanced budget which implies
PH;t (TtYt   Trt) + PH;t 1t 1 = 0: (11)
Combining (5), (10), and (11), we get the economys current account which can be expressed in
log-linear form as
bt = bt 1   
1  qt + yt   ct (12)
Combining (7)-(9) we get
it   it = Etst+1 +Gvt   ( + ) bt (13)
where G is the fraction of noise traders,  denotes the elasticity of borrowing cost  with respect
to BF;tStPt . Equation (13) is the uncovered interest parity condition between Home and Foreign
economies. The noise term vt can alternatively be interpreted as shock to the risk premium purely
due to forex market disturbances.9 In the last term,  bt reects that a higher bond holding
reduces the interest premium {^t   it charged by foreign investors and by parity reduces the interest
rate in the domestic bond market. A higher  , by reducing the demand for bonds, requires a lower
{^t in equilibrium if bt is unchanged.
Equations (3), (4), (12), and (13) summarize the models equilibrium conditions. An analogous
set of expressions characterize the world economy. In what follows, we focus solely on shocks to
Home economy and assume that the world economy is in steady state with ct = t = 0.
3 Monetary Policy
Having characterized the decentralized equilibrium, we are now set to evaluate and compare alter-
native monetary rules. Before studying the impact of noise trading on these rules under general
preferences as specied in (1) and (2), we rst nest our results with those highlighted by Gali and
Monacelli (2005) and De Paoli (2009a, 2009b) for unit elasticity of intertemporal and intratem-
poral consumption substitution i.e.,  =  = 1. This particular case allows for a straightforward
analytical exposition of optimal policies, as discussed below.
3.1 Implementing e¢ cient/exible-price allocations under unit trade elasticity
( = 1)
Notice from (4) that with exible prices, i.e.,  = 0 and k ! 1. The rst term within brackets
on the RHS of (4) represents the log deviation of real marginal cost (as a ratio of domestic prices)
9See, for example, Aldolfson (2008) and Dennis et. al. (2009).
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from its steady state value, i.e., the mark up. By keeping the real marginal cost xed at its steady
state mark up value implies t = 0 for all t. Thus, complete price stability obtains exible price
allocations since rms have no desire to change prices. Under complete asset markets, Gali and
Monacelli (2005) show that when intertemporal as well as intratemporal elasticities of consumption
substitution equal unity, second order approximation of utility function is isomorphic to that in a
closed economy: it is independent of terms of trade (and therefore the real exchange rates) and
depends only upon domestic ination and output gap. By stabilizing domestic ination, output
gap is also stabilized, and the rst best is achieved. This is done by setting labor subsidies such
that the e¤ective steady state mark up equals 11  and then setting ination to zero for all times.
Essentially, this policy eliminates ine¢ ciency due to monopolistic competition as well as due to
price rigidities.
De Paoli (2009b) further shows that the above result is invariant to the structure of asset
markets and continues to hold even under autarky when the trade elasticity  = 1.10 Since the
welfare function in our model coincides with that obtained by De Paoli (2009b) when  = 1; a
policy of complete price stability continues to be e¢ cient even when noise traders are present in
forex markets.
3.2 Optimal monetary policy when  6= 1
We now derive the policymakers objective function as a second order approximation of the house-
holds utility function and then study optimal monetary policy under commitment (with timeless
perspective) when  6= 1. This is the case studied by De Paoli (2009b) and our objective here is to
show how the results change under noise trading in forex markets.
Following De Paoli (2009b), we derive the loss function of the central bank as a second order
approximation of the utility function:
Lw =
1
2
[yt qt]Ly [yt qt]
0 + [yt qt]Let +
1
2
l
2
t (14)
where Ly = [lyy lyq; lyq lqq], Le = [ly; lq]. The coe¢ cients ls are functions of fundamental pa-
rameters of the economy.11 Essentially the loss function indicates that the central bank aims at
balancing uctuations in output, ination, and real exchange movements. Intuitively, the presence
of staggered prices and monopolistic competition implies there are gains in minimizing output and
ination uctuations. In addition, in an open economy, there is an incentive to manage uctuations
in the real exchange rate to minimize the wedge between the marginal utility of consumption and
the marginal utility of production.
As evident, with  6= 1 a real exchange rate term appears in the welfare function. Then a policy
of complete price stability is no longer optimal.12 The optimal policy now minimizes (14) subject
to (3), (4), (12) and (13). As shown by De Paoli (2009b), in a special case where  =  = 0, the
10That a perfect risk sharing occurs through terms of trade movements, even in the absence of asset trade, when
home and foreign goods have a unit elasticity of substitution was rst shown by Cole and Obstfeld (1991).
11See Appendix for details.
12With complete asset markets, De Paoli (2009a) shows that when  > 1, the small open economy has an incentive
to have its real exchange rate appreciated, which in equilibrium can be achieved by stabilizing real/nominal exchange
rates. A real exchange rate appreciation shifts demand towards imports and thus causes less disutility from labor.
Consumption does not su¤er because of market completeness and welfare improves as a result. Conversely, a real
depreciation works better when  < 1.
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rst order conditions for the problem can be summarized as13
WqEt
 
qt+1   qTt+1

+WyEt
 
yt+1   yTt+1

+WEtt+1 = 0 (15)
where XTt+1 denotes a targeting value for variable X. According to the above rule, optimal policy
responds to movements in output, ination, and real exchange rate. Even though the weights W
of optimal policy are a function of the structural parameters of the model, one can show that the
welfare is critically a¤ected by the nature of the shock and the magnitude of the Tobin tax. It
is worth noting that the e¢ cient level of output in this case is given by yTt =  

+ 1 


Wy
t and
therefore a function only of productivity shocks, the target level of real exchange rate is zero (see
appendix for details).
In the absence of noise traders, i.e., with G = 0 in equation (13), De Paoli (2009b) has shown
in a complete reversal of the results obtained under complete asset markets in De Paoli (2009a)
that domestic ination targeting dominates xed exchange rates under productivity shocks for
su¢ ciently high trade elasticities with  > 1.14
3.3 Monetary policy under noise trading in forex markets
We now contrast an IT regime (it = t) and a PEG (st = 0) with the optimal policy characterized
by (15).15 Below, we perform numerical simulations and compare equilibrium dynamics of ination,
output, consumption, and real exchange rates, in order to build intuition and quantify welfare losses
under the two rules relative to the optimal policy under commitment with the timeless perspective
(Woodford 1999). Following much of the literature (see, for example, Gali and Monacelli (2005),
De Paoli (2009a, 2009b)) we compute the loss function under optimal policy as well as for the two
rules IT and PEG by evaluating their unconditional expectations.16 We then evaluate the impact
of Tobin taxes on welfare.
Our objective is to evaluate policies when the economy is subject to productivity shocks t and
there are noise traders in the forex market. To build intuition, however, we rst evaluate welfare
under alternative policies in the presence of noise traders but without productivity shocks, then
under productivity shocks but no noise traders. Finally, we rank the two rules when both shocks
occur simultaneously.
The exercises below are conducted with the baseline parameters shown in Table 1. To avoid
clutter, we study impulse responses (with one shock at a time) for the case with  > 1 by setting
 = 1:5. With both shocks in the model, we present the welfare and volatility results for  = 2 as
well as  = 0:5:
13As has been extensively noted in the literature there are challenges to implementing this as a rule as there are
issues of determinacy that crop up.
14Here, unlike under complete markets, an exchange rate stabilization by appreciating real exchange rate reduces
demand for domestic goods and its negative income e¤ect more than erodes the welfare gains from reduced disutility
of labor.
15De Paoli (2009b) considers a strict ination targeting rule wherein domestic ination is always set to zero.
However, as has been documented in the literature, there are challenges to implementing this policy as a simple rule
and issues related with determinacy crop up. We therefore adopt the more practical exible ination targeting rule.
16Using unconditional expectation essentially eliminates the timeless perspective policys dependence on the initial
state. There is a debate in the literature on the choice of unconditional welfare measure vis-à-vis its conditional
measure in this case. Dennis (2010) proposes an alternative measure of conditional loss and then shows that under
this measure discretion outperforms timeless perspective policy. We compare optimal committment policy with the
two rules IT and PEG (with committment), and the exercises we undertake are consistent with this objective. As
we do not study discretionary policy, we feel that the issues raised by Dennis (2010) are not germane to our paper.
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3.3.1 With noise traders, without productivity shocks
Consider a temporary increase in risk premium shock, vt. The e¢ cient level of output without a
productivity shock however remains unchanged. Therefore, the optimal policy calls for insulating
the real side of the economy. Figure 1.A shows that the movement in ination, output and real
exchange rates are minimal under optimal policy. Intuitively, the depreciation of the real exchange
rate due to a rise in vt increases aggregate demand. In order to stabilize demand, optimal policy
raises interest rate to lower domestic consumption that implies higher savings and higher bond
holdings. A rise in interest rate thus stabilizes output as well as ination. In addition, a rise in
interest rate by raising expected exchange rate appreciation partially o¤sets the real depreciation.
It is easily checked that a rise in interest rate along with a real depreciation and increase in bond
holdings is consistent with (13).
In contrast, real exchange depreciates substantially under the IT regime leading to a sharp
increase in demand. The dynamics under the PEG are similar to those exhibited under optimal
policy. The PEG, by stabilizing exchange rate allows the interest rate to absorb the rise in vt.
The consequent rise in interest rate stabilizes domestic demand and ination. This can be seen in
Table 2, which reports the standard deviations and the welfare loss, expressed as a percentage of
steady state consumption, under the alternative monetary regimes. The lower ination and output
variability under the PEG brings it closer to the optimal policy and as a result it outperforms the
IT regime.
Table 2 shows that welfare under all regimes improves with an increase in Tobin tax. Intuitively,
an increase in Tobin tax reduces the demand for foreign bonds while a rise in vt increases the
demand for foreign bonds. Ceteris paribus, raising Tobin taxes o¤sets rise in vt in the forex market.
Required policy interest rate changes are muted as a result, in turn, without much a¤ecting output
and ination.
3.3.2 With productivity Shocks, without noise traders
Now consider a temporary rise in productivity, . Figure 1.B shows that under an optimal policy
ination stays at while the output rises. Intuitively, a rise in productivity calls for an increase in
output due to an increase in its e¢ cient level. This is engineered by a decrease in policy interest
rate that also lets real exchange rate depreciate. As a result, the demand for Home goods rises
thus raising its output. Since output, domestic consumption, and real exchange rate comove with
the productivity shock, the real marginal cost and ination (see (4)) remain stabilized.
Since the optimal policy entails ination stabilization, the dynamics exhibited by the IT regime
closely mimic those under the optimal policy. The PEG on the other hand, by unduly stabilizing real
exchange rate (Table 2), constrains interest rate and output movements. It leads to a substantial
deation and muted rise in domestic consumption and Home output. As a result, as in De Paoli
(2009b), the IT regime welfare dominates a PEG (Table 2 ).
As evident from Table 2, a positive Tobin tax reduces welfare under all regimes. Intuitively,
as savings (and bond holdings) comove with productivity shock (income e¤ect) a positive Tobin
tax stabilizes nominal (and therefore real) exchange rates excessively relative to what optimality
commands.17
17As can be seen from (13), for a given intreest rate, a postive Tobin tax requires an appreciation (depreciation)
under positive (negative) productivity shock if b comoves with .
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3.3.3 With productivity shocks and noise trading in forex markets
Consider now the following structure of shocks
t = "t 1 + e;t; (16)
vt = ev;t;
where e;t and ev;t are uncorrelated i.i.d. white noise shocks.
Table 3 clearly indicates that under this scenario the PEG dominates the IT regime for  = 2 as
well as  = 0:5 . For  > 1, productivity shocks call for real exchange rate exibility with ination
stability, whereas the risk premium shocks require the opposite. For the shock variances exhibited
in Table 1, it turns out that risk premium shock takes precedence over productivity shock in the
determination of optimal policy response. As a result, the PEG dominates the IT regime for  = 2.
Table 3 shows that when  = 2; a positive Tobin tax lowers welfare under the PEG while
the reverse is the case under the IT regime. Recall from our preceding discussion that with only
productivity shocks (but no noise traders) the IT regime outperforms the PEG; now it is the
presence of noise traders in addition that makes the PEG superior. Imposing Tobin taxes in
addition stabilize real exchange rate excessively and thus reduce welfare under the PEG. In contrast,
since the IT regime performs poorly precisely because of real exchange rate instability, Tobin taxes
improve the regimes performance.
That the PEG dominates the IT regime for  = 0:5 comes as no surprise since De Paoli (2009b)
has shown this to hold for a su¢ ciently low  even without noise traders. The logic o¤ered is that
(i) stabilizing real exchange rate causes its appreciation and (ii) with incomplete markets and with
Home and Foreign goods being complements, a real exchange rate appreciation improves welfare
through a positive income e¤ect. As a result, the relative desirability of PEG vis-à-vis IT increases
further when  = 0:5 relative to  = 2. As evident in Table 3, imposing Tobin taxes further improve
welfare by stabilizes real exchange rates, irrespective of the regime in place.18
4 Conclusions
The objective of this paper is twofold. First, we rank two classic rules, xed exchange rates and
ination targeting, in a small open economy with incomplete markets and noise traders in the forex
market. Second, we evaluate the impact of Tobin taxes under each of these two rules.
The key message of the paper is that the presence of noise traders in the forex market increases
the desirability of xed exchange rates vis-à-vis ination targeting, irrespective of the trade elasticity
between domestic and foreign goods. More specically, with noise traders in the forex market and
with shocks to productivity, a xed exchange rate regime dominates ination targeting even when
the two goods are substitutes, reversing the result highlighted by De Paoli (2009b). The simple
intuition is that the presence of noise traders generate excess volatility of real exchange rates, which
is neutralized by xing exchange rates.
Tobin tax acts as an additional instrument to stabilize real exchange rates further. When
domestic and foreign goods are substitutes, these taxes overstablize the real exchange rate under
18Our results are robust to changes in the variance and persistence of risk premium shocks as well as trade openness
and activeness of IT policy. The results are not reported here due to space limitations. They can be obtained from
the authors on request.
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a xed exchange rate regime and perform poorly, whereas under ination targeting they improve
welfare by providing some stability to the real exchange rate. On the other hand, when the domestic
and foreign goods are complements, Tobin taxes improve performance irrespective of the regime in
place a result which is in line with the ndings in De Paoli (2009b).
A shortcoming of this paper is that the number of noise traders is assumed to be exogenous.
One potential direction for future research would be to endogenize the entry of noise traders and
reevaluate the performance of the two classic rules and Tobin taxes within this papers setup.
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Appendix
Loss Function
The coe¢ cients of the loss function are19
lyy =
( 1 + + + )  (1 + ( 2 + ))( 1 + )2     1 + +   2  5+ 22 
( 1 + )2((1 + ( 2 + )  ) +   2+ ( 1 + ))
lyq =
( 1 + + + )  1 + 2(3  4) + 3( 1 + ) + ( 3 + 4)
( 1 + )3((1 + ( 2 + )  ) +   2+ ( 1 + ))
lqq =  
( 1 + + + )

( 1 + )2  1  3+ 2+ 2( 2 + )3
 ( 1 + )   2 + 3(1 + )  2(5 + 4) + (6 + 4)

( 1 + )4((1 + ( 2 + )  ) +   2+ ( 1 + ))
ly =   (1 + ( 2 + ))( 1 + + + )
((1 + ( 2 + )  ) +   2+ ( 1 + ))
lq = 0
See online Appendix for derivation.
Optimal Policy
For a special case where  =  = 0, the optimal policy can be reduced to
0 = WqEt
 
qt+1   qTt+1

+WyEt
 
yt+1   yTt+1

+WEtt+1
where
Wy = lyq +

 +
1  


lyy; Wq = lqq +

 +
1  


lyq
W =

1
1  

+

 +
1  



yTt =  

 + 1 

Wy
t; q
T
t =  
lq
Wq
t = 0
19The derivations have been provided in the detailed version of the paper.
11
 12 
 
Table 1: Baseline Parameters 
Parameter Value Remarks 
λ 0.4 Trade openness 
β 0.99 Discount factor (annual real interest rate of 4%) 
η 1.6 Inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply 
α 0.75 Calvo sticky price parameter: average of 4 quarters of price rigidity 
θ 1.5 Elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods 
δ 0.01 Elasticity of risk premium with respect to foreign debt size 
σ 6 Elasticity of substitution among differentiated intermediate goods 
ρ 2 Coefficient of relative risk aversion 
γ θλ (2 - λ) / (1 - λ)  
k (1 - αβ)(1 - α)/α(1 + ση)  
     0.95 Persistence of productivity shock 
       0.07 Standard deviation of productivity and risk premium shocks 
   2.5 Activeness of interest rate targeting 
 
 
Table 2: Welfare Loss and Variance of Key Variables 
Policy Parameter Welfare loss                      
Risk premium Shock      
IT     0.0018 9.95E-04 2.54E-03 6.17E-07 
PEG 
 
-4.45E-07 9.26E-07 8.78E-05 1.05E-07 
OP 
 
-0.00022 8.34E-05 5.41E-05 2.00E-09 
IT        0.0017 9.54E-04 2.45E-03 6.04E-07 
PEG 
 
-1.00E-06 8.83E-07 8.56E-05 1.00E-07 
OP 
 
-0.00021 7.95E-05 5.11E-05 2.07E-09 
Productivity Shock 
     
IT     -0.0155 0.0017 0.0117 1.23E-05 
PEG  -0.0130 0.0011 0.0083 8.97E-06 
OP  -0.0189 0.0018 0.0124 1.16E-08 
IT        -0.0131 0.0015 0.0112 1.50E-05 
PEG 
 
-0.0121 0.0010 0.0081 8.18E-06 
OP  -0.0171 0.0016 0.0120 7.62E-09 
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Table 3: Welfare Loss and Variance When Both Shocks Are Turned On 
Policy     Parameter Welfare loss                      
IT   =2 0.1025 0.0464 0.1687 2.27E-04 
PEG  
 
0.0334 0.0017 0.0368 5.03E-05 
IT   =0.5 -0.2076 0.0078 0.0006 1.05E-05 
PEG  
 
-0.4845 0.0016 0.0006 3.04E-06 
 
Policy        Parameter Welfare loss                      
IT   =2 0.0930 0.0407 0.1522 1.80E-04 
PEG  
 
0.0349 0.0015 0.0364 4.68E-05 
IT   =0.5 -0.3157 0.0089 0.0007 1.52E-06 
PEG  
 
-0.5249 0.0016 0.0006 3.28E-06 
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Figure 1: Impulse Response of Key Variables  
A. Risk Premium Shock 
 
B. Productivity Shock
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